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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
Cheryl Williams, an African-American woman, 
claims that she was subjected to constant harassment at the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (the 
“Commission”) by her supervisors, Joseph Retort and Adam 
Stalczynski.  As a result of this treatment, she alleges she faced 
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a hostile work environment and was ultimately constructively 
discharged from her position as a Human Relations 
Representative.  She then filed this action against the 
Commission under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(“Title VII”),1 seeking damages for the loss of her job and the 
harm sustained to her physical and emotional health.  She also 
included claims against her former supervisors, Retort and 
Stalczynski, claiming that they violated her federal rights under 
Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)2 
and they are therefore liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.3  On defendants’ motion, the District Court granted 
summary judgment in favor of all defendants. 
 
In this case, we address for the first time whether 
violations of Title VII and the ADA may be brought through 
§ 1983.  In light of the comprehensive administrative scheme 
established by Title VII and the ADA, we conclude that these 
claims, standing alone, may not be asserted under § 1983.  And 
because we also agree with the District Court that Plaintiff 
Cheryl Williams presents no triable issues of fact on her 
Title VII claims against the Commission, we will affirm. 
   
  
                                                 
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. 
2 42 U.S.C. § 12112, et seq. 
3 As discussed more fully below, § 1983 allows plaintiffs to 
recover damages when their federal constitutional or statutory 
rights are violated by state actors. 
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I.  
 
A. 
 
Williams was originally employed at the 
Commission in the early 1990s, and she returned to the 
Commission in September 1999 as a Human Relations 
Representative in the Pittsburgh office.  There, she was tasked 
with investigating complaints of discrimination, interviewing 
witnesses, negotiating settlements, conducting fact-finding 
conferences, and writing reports and conciliation 
recommendations.  Williams also served as Chairperson of a 
union that represents Commission investigators, acting as the 
primary negotiator for matters related to their terms and 
conditions of employment.   
 
Williams was primarily supervised by Joseph 
Retort, a Caucasian man, from 2010 until her resignation in 
January 2014.  She was also indirectly supervised by the 
Executive Director of the Pittsburgh office, a post held by 
George Simmons during most of Williams’s time at the 
Commission.  Eventually, Simmons retired and, in December 
2012, Adam Stalczynski assumed the role of Executive 
Director.  He supervised Williams until her resignation. 
    
Williams claims that, between 2009 and 2013, she 
suffered discrimination at the hands of various Commission 
personnel, primarily Joseph Retort and Adam Stalczynski.  
Specifically, she alleges that: (1) she was suspended without 
pay for five days in 2009 after she objected to the presence of 
Commission attorneys at fact-finding conferences, (2) the 
Commission refused to accommodate her workstation needs 
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when they moved offices in 2010, 4  (3) Retort improperly 
placed her on a performance improvement plan for a few weeks 
in 2010, (4) she was struck by a Commission attorney in 2011 
while attempting to leave Simmons’s office, (5) her co-worker 
overheard a Commission attorney call Williams a “bitch” in 
2012, 5  and (6) she was wrongly reprimanded for 
insubordination in August 2013 following a confrontation with 
Stalczynski regarding her requests for leave.  Williams 
contends that each of these incidents, both individually and in 
their totality, were not the result of common workplace strife, 
but were unlawful instances of discrimination based on her 
status as an African-American woman.  
  
After leaving work in August 2013, Williams 
submitted a Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) request 
seeking leave from the Commission because she had leg pain 
and diffuse muscle aches from fibromyalgia.  She was granted 
FMLA leave through February 2014, but never returned to 
work.  She resigned from the Commission several months later. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Williams suffers from certain physical ailments, primarily 
fibromyalgia and chronic musculoskeletal pain.  Fibromyalgia 
is a chronic pain disorder that causes widespread pain and 
tenderness to touch.  Williams had previously received various 
accommodations, including voice-activated computer 
software, a telephone headset, a raised monitor, a trackball 
mouse, and a footstool due to these conditions.  But after the 
move to a new office building in 2010, the Commission did not 
provide Williams with her previous workstation set up.  
5 App. at 719. 
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B. 
 
In November 2013, Williams lodged a charge of 
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”).  She subsequently received a right-to-
sue letter from the EEOC and filed a four-count amended 
complaint with the District Court.  Only two counts of her 
complaint are relevant to this appeal:6 (1) a claim against the 
Commission for discrimination, hostile work environment, and 
constructive discharge under Title VII; and (2) a § 1983 claim 
against her supervisors, Retort and Stalczynski, based on 
violations of Title VII and the ADA.7   
                                                 
6 After a partial motion to dismiss, the District Court dismissed 
claims against the Commission for violations of the ADA, the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Act (“PHRA”).  Williams v. Pa. Human 
Relations Comm’n, No. 14-1290, 2016 WL 6834612, at *1 
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2016); Williams v. Pa. Human Relations 
Comm'n, No. 14-1290, 2015 WL 222388, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 
14, 2015).  These claims are not before us on appeal.  
7  Williams also included § 1983 claims against Retort and 
Stalczynski based on PHRA violations.  However, it is beyond 
dispute that PHRA claims are not cognizable under § 1983 
because they are derived from state, rather than federal, law.  
McMullen v. Maple Shade Twp., 643 F.3d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(“Thus, by its terms, § 1983 provides a remedy for violations 
of federal, not state or local, law.”).  And, on appeal, Williams 
advances no argument that PHRA rights may be vindicated 
under § 1983.  See Appellant’s Br. at 7-13. 
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On defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the 
District Court first entered judgment in favor of Retort and 
Stalczynski on Williams’s § 1983 claim, concluding that Title 
VII and ADA claims cannot be vindicated through § 1983 
because doing so would frustrate Congress’s statutory 
scheme.8  With respect to Williams’s Title VII claim against 
the Commission, the District Court determined that Williams 
was required to file a complaint with the EEOC within 300 
days of any alleged unlawful employment practice, and 
therefore any discrete discriminatory acts outside this period 
were not cognizable.9  The Court then addressed every alleged 
adverse employment action and determined that, under the 
totality of the circumstances, these incidents were not severe 
or persistent enough to sustain a claim for hostile work 
environment or constructive discharge.10  Thus, the District 
Court entered summary judgment for the Commission on 
Williams’s Title VII claims.  
                                                 
8 Williams, 2016 WL 6834612, at *11-13. 
9 Id. at *13-18. 
10 Id. at *18-25. 
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II.11 
 
Williams maintains that the District Court erred by 
(1) granting summary judgment for Retort and Stalczynski on 
her § 1983 claims, and (2) granting summary judgment for the 
Commission on her Title VII claims.  Both arguments are 
unavailing.   
A. 
 
Williams first contends that, contrary to the District 
Court’s conclusion, her ADA and Title VII claims against 
Retort and Stalczynski are cognizable under § 1983.  We, 
however, reject this argument and, in line with every circuit to 
address this issue, hold that plaintiffs may not seek damages 
under § 1983 for stand-alone violations of either Title VII or 
the ADA. 
 
                                                 
11 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1367.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment, applying the same 
standard that the court should have applied.  Howley v. Mellon 
Fin. Corp., 625 F.3d 788, 792 (3d Cir. 2010).  Summary 
judgment should be granted if, viewing the facts in the light 
most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A 
dispute about a material fact is “genuine” only if the evidence 
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 
nonmoving party.  Capps v. Mondelez Glob., LLC, 847 F.3d 
144, 151 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). 
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Section 1983 reads: 
 
Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of 
the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress . . . .12 
It is well settled that § 1983 does not confer any substantive 
rights, but merely “provides a method for vindicating federal 
rights elsewhere conferred.” 13   Even when an independent 
federal right exists, however, Congress may choose to 
foreclose a remedy under § 1983, either by expressly 
“forbidding recourse to § 1983 in the statute itself,” or by 
“creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is 
incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983.”14  In 
determining whether a § 1983 action is disallowed, “[t]he 
crucial consideration is what Congress intended.”15 
                                                 
12 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
13 Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cty., 757 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 
2014) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994)). 
14 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997). 
15 Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 252 
(2009) (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012 
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Both Title VII—which prohibits employment 
discrimination based on an individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin 16 —and the ADA—which prohibits 
employment discrimination based on an individual’s 
disability 17 —utilize the same comprehensive remedial 
scheme.18  As relevant here, in states with an agency authorized 
to grant relief for prohibited employment discrimination, like 
Pennsylvania, employees must resort to that state remedy.19  
Employees must also file a “charge” with the EEOC within 300 
days of the alleged unlawful employment practice, or within 
30 days after receiving notice that the analogous state agency 
                                                 
(1984)); City of Rancho Palos Verdes, Cal. v. Abrams, 544 
U.S. 113, 120 (2005) (same). 
16 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
17 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).  
18 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); see Apsley v. Boeing Co., 691 F.3d 
1184, 1210 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Under both Title VII and the 
ADA, exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite 
to suit.”); Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 
(3d Cir. 2006). 
19 Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 851, 854 (3d Cir. 
2000) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)).  Indeed, “a Title VII 
plaintiff must wait 60 days after proceedings have commenced 
under state or local law to file a charge with the EEOC, unless 
such proceedings have earlier terminated.” Nat’l R.R. 
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 119 (2002) (citing 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)). 
11 
 
has terminated proceedings, whichever is earlier. 20   The 
purpose of this exhaustion requirement is “to give the 
administrative agency the opportunity to investigate, mediate, 
and take remedial action.”21  Indeed, if “there is reasonable 
cause to believe that the charge is true,” the EEOC must 
attempt to “eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment 
practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and 
persuasion.”22  And if that process fails, the EEOC (or the 
Attorney General) may either bring suit in federal court, or, 
alternatively, notify the employee so that he or she may 
institute an employment discrimination suit within 90 days.23 
In stark contrast, § 1983 has only a one-step 
“remedial scheme”: plaintiffs may file § 1983 suits directly in 
                                                 
20 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Noel v. Boeing Co., 622 F.3d 
266, 270 (3d Cir. 2010). 
21 Fowlkes v. Ironworkers Local 40, 790 F.3d 378, 384 (2d Cir. 
2015) (quoting Brown v. Coach Stores, Inc., 163 F.3d 706, 712 
(2d Cir. 1998)). 
22 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). 
23 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see McGovern v. City of Phila., 
554 F.3d 114, 115 n.1 (3d Cir. 2009) (“A claimant is required 
to file a Title VII suit within 90 days of receiving a Right to 
Sue Letter.”).  Where, as here, the employer is a “government, 
governmental agency, or political subdivision”, “the [EEOC] 
shall take no further action and shall refer the case to the 
Attorney General who may bring a civil action against such 
respondent in the appropriate United States district court.”  42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). 
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federal court.24  There is neither an administrative process to 
be exhausted25 nor any mechanism by which discriminatory 
practices may be informally resolved with an administrative 
agency.  
 
Given these respective statutes, Congress’s intent is 
clear.  Allowing pure Title VII and ADA claims under § 1983 
would thwart Congress’s carefully crafted administrative 
scheme by throwing open a back door to the federal courthouse 
when the front door is purposefully fortified. 26   Moreover, 
while Title VII and the ADA impose liability only on 
employers, permitting a plaintiff to sue under § 1983 based on 
                                                 
24 See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 254 
(2009) (noting that § 1983 provides “a direct route to court”); 
Keller v. Prince George’s Cty., 827 F.2d 952, 955 (4th Cir. 
1987) (“A Title VII claimant must also exhaust her state and 
federal administrative remedies before being allowed to 
proceed to federal court; § 1983 has no similar exhaustion 
requirement.”). 
25  Of course, some plaintiffs may have administrative 
exhaustion requirements independent of § 1983.  The Prison 
Litigation Reform Act, for example, “mandates that prisoners 
exhaust internal prison grievance procedures before filing 
suit.”  Small v. Camden Cty., 728 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)). 
26 See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1024 (1984) (“It would 
make little sense for Congress to have established such a 
detailed and comprehensive administrative system and yet 
allow individuals to bypass the system, at their option, by 
bringing suits directly to the courts under [ ] § 1983.”).   
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violations of these same statutes would open individuals, like 
Retort and Stalczynski here, to employment discrimination 
suits.27  As the Supreme Court has advised, our primary inquiry 
is whether “the statutes at issue require[] plaintiffs to comply 
with particular procedures and/or to exhaust particular 
administrative remedies prior to filing suit.”28  Title VII and 
the ADA do exactly that. 
 
This conclusion is not only supported but compelled 
by other cases in this area.  The Supreme Court, for instance, 
has routinely found that analogous administrative schemes 
have precluded § 1983 actions seeking to remedy violations of 
those schemes alone.  In City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 
California v. Abrams, the Court held that the “complex and 
novel statutory scheme” of the Telecommunications Act of 
                                                 
27 See Roman-Oliveras v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth., 655 F.3d 43, 
52 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Title I of the ADA, like Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act, addresses the conduct of employers only and 
does not impose liability on co-workers.”  (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted)); Koslow v. Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161, 178 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that 
there is no individual liability under the Title I of the ADA); 
Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 
1078 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (“Congress did not intend to hold 
individual employees liable under Title VII.”).   
28 Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 254 (drawing this principle from 
prior Supreme Court cases); see also Hildebrand, 757 F.3d at 
108 (“The Supreme Court has consistently indicated that the 
comprehensiveness of a statute’s remedial scheme is the 
primary factor in determining congressional intent.”). 
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1996 prohibits suits under § 1983.29  And in the seminal case 
of Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea 
Clammers Association, the Court similarly found that the 
“unusually elaborate enforcement provisions” of the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 and the 
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 
forbid § 1983 actions.30  Following the Supreme Court’s lead, 
this Court has correspondingly held that comprehensive 
remedial schemes akin to Title VII and the ADA forestall 
actions under § 1983.31  And, indeed, every circuit to consider 
this exact question has held that, while a plaintiff may use 
§ 1983 “as a vehicle for vindicating rights independently 
conferred by the Constitution,”32 Title VII and ADA statutory 
                                                 
29 544 U.S. 113, 127 (2005) 
30 453 U.S. 1, 13-18 (1981); see Smith, 468 U.S. at 1009-16 
(holding that the “comprehensive scheme” of the Education of 
the Handicapped Act (“EHA”) precludes § 1983 suits based on 
violations of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection 
Clause because they are nearly identical to EHA claims). 
31  See, e.g., Hildebrand, 757 F.3d at 109 (holding that the 
“comprehensive remedial scheme” of the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act precludes § 1983 suits); A.W. v. Jersey 
City Pub. Sch., 486 F.3d 791, 806 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc) 
(holding that the “comprehensive remedial scheme” of the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and the 
Rehabilitation Act precludes some § 1983 suits).   
32 Henley v. Brown, 686 F.3d 634, 642 (8th Cir. 2012). 
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rights cannot be vindicated through § 1983.33 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that Williams may not 
seek damages against Retort and Stalczynski under § 1983 for 
statutory violations of either Title VII or the ADA, standing 
alone.34   
                                                 
33 Title VII: Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 620 n.4 (7th Cir. 
2012); Henley, 686 F.3d at 642; Johnson v. City of Fort 
Lauderdale, 148 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 1998); Southard 
v. Tex. Bd. of Criminal Justice, 114 F.3d 539, 549-50 (5th Cir. 
1997); Notari v. Denver Water Dep’t, 971 F.2d 585, 587 (10th 
Cir. 1992); see Stilwell v. City of Williams, 831 F.3d 1234, 
1250 (9th Cir. 2016); Weberg v. Franks, 229 F.3d 514, 522 (6th 
Cir. 2000); Annis v. Cty. of Westchester, N.Y., 36 F.3d 251, 254 
(2d Cir. 1994); Beardsley v. Webb, 30 F.3d 524, 527 (4th Cir. 
1994). 
ADA: Tri-Corp Hous. Inc. v. Bauman, 826 F.3d 446, 449 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 592 (2016); Vinson v. Thomas, 
288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002); Alsbrook v. City of 
Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1011 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc); 
Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, Ga., 112 F.3d 1522, 1531 (11th 
Cir. 1997).  
34 Given that Williams premised her § 1983 claims solely on 
violations of Title VII and the ADA, we need not address 
whether a plaintiff may allege independent constitutional 
violations under § 1983 based on the same underlying facts.  
At least in the Title VII context, however, there is a strong 
argument that plaintiffs may advance an employment 
discrimination claim under § 1983 based on an Equal 
Protection Clause violation, either concurrently with, or 
independent of, a Title VII violation.  See cases cited, supra, 
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B. 
 
We now turn to Williams’s Title VII claims against 
the Commission.  After a careful review of the record on 
appeal, the parties’ arguments, and the District Court’s 
thorough opinion, we find these claims to be without merit.  
Accordingly, and for substantially the same reasons expressed 
by the District Court, we will affirm the grant of summary 
judgment for the Commission on Williams’s Title VII claims.   
 
III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Retort and 
Stalczynski on Williams’s § 1983 claims, and in favor of the 
Commission on William’s Title VII claims. 
                                                 
Note 33; Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 
1079 (3d Cir. 1990) (explaining “that the comprehensive 
scheme provided in Title VII does not preempt section 1983, 
and that discrimination claims may be brought under either 
statute, or both”). 
